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The Other China Model: Daoism, Pluralism,
and Political Liberalism
Devin K. Joshi, Singapore Management University
While scholars often portray Chinese political thought and tradition as standing in oppo-
sition to Western notions of political liberalism, little consideration has been given to com-
patibility between liberalism and Daoism, a prominent religion and long-standing alterna-
tive school of thought among Chinese peoples. Addressing this gap in the literature, this
study in comparative political thought compares Laozi’s Dao De Jing with John Stuart Mill’s
On Liberty to illustrate certain core political ideas in the Dao De Jing and their treatment in
Mill’s landmark text on political liberalism. Although the two texts diverge in terms of ad-
vocacy of popular representation, public contestation, and legal rights, both reject author-
itarianism, uniformity, patriarchy, censorship, harm, violence, and wastefulness. A reason-
able interpretation of these affinities is that a unique, indigenous, and non-Western model
of liberalism existed in China via Laozi’s thought for centuries before the advent of modern
Western liberalism.
Keywords: China, comparative political thought, Daoism, Laozi, liberalism, John Stuart
Mill
It is commonly believed that one of the last remaining obstacles to the globalspread of liberal democracy is the persistence of worldviews that fundamen-
tally conflict with liberalism.1 In particular, scholars have claimed that Chinese cul-
ture is incompatible with Western political ideals and that the statist China model,
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2018 General Conference of the European
Consortium for Political Research in Hamburg, Germany, under the title “Daoism and Political
Liberalism: Two Birds of a Feather?” The author would like to thank Alexander Weiß, members
of the ECPR Standing Group on Political Concepts, and Polity’s anonymous reviewers for their
helpful suggestions for improving the article.
1. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press,
1992); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Diego Von Vacano, “The Scope of Comparative Polit-
ical Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 465–80; and Edmund Fawcett, Lib-
eralism: The Life of an Idea, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018), 21.
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with supposed roots in Confucianism, sets forth a variety of precepts that chal-
lenge the desirability and feasibility of political liberalism and the freedom of in-
dividuals as a primary goal of governance.2 Moreover, as Shaun Breslin contends,
while “the idea of a China model” may be “more important as a symbol or a met-
aphor than as a distinct and coherent model,” it has been used to “defend political
inequality and the status quo in China” while also attracting considerable interest
abroad.3
Nowadays, most scholars comparing traditional Chinese political thought to
Western political thinking focus onConfucianism.4 Chinese political thinking, how-
ever, embracesmultiple perspectives, and one of its prominent alternative schools of
thought is Daoism. Like Confucianism, Daoism has a long legacy stretching over
two thousand years, and it has experienced a resurgence in membership, scholar-
ship, and temple construction since the end of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–
76).5 Among Chinese religions, it is second only to Buddhism in numbers of clergy,
and there aremillions of followers of Daoismwithinmainland China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore.6 Although less prominent in public intellectual discourse than
Confucianism, the importance of Daoism as “the only native religion among all the
2. See Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015); Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can It
Replace the Western Model of Modernization?” Journal of Contemporary China 19 (2010): 419–
36; David Elstein, “Why Early Confucianism Cannot Generate Democracy,” Dao 9 (2010): 427–
43; and Megan C. Thomas, “Orientalism and Comparative Political Theory,” Review of Politics
72 (2010): 653–77.
3. Shaun Breslin, “The ‘China Model’ and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chi-
nese Mode of Governance?” International Affairs 87 (2011): 1323–43, at 1328, 1341.
4. See, for instance, Fred Dallmayr, ed., Comparative Political Theory: An Introduction (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), which contains multiple chapters on Confucianism and none
on Daoism. Similarly, Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
World Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), contains four chapters on Con-
fucianism but only one on Daoism.
5. John J. Clarke, Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought (New York:
Routledge, 2000); Kenneth Dean, Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of Southeast China (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Vincent Goosaert and Fang Ling, “Temples and
Daoists in Urban China since 1980,” China Perspectives (2009): 32–41; Livia Kohn, Daoism
and Chinese Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Three Pines Press, 2001), and Der-Ruey Yang, “The
Changing Economy of Temple Daoism in Shanghai,” in State, Market, and Religions in Chinese
Societies, ed. Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney (Boston: Brill, 2005), 113–48.
6. Chinese government surveys cited byWenzel-Teuber have found 12million people identifying
as Daoists and over 100 million engaging in various Daoist practices in mainland China alone. See
KatharinaWenzel-Teubler, “Volksrepublik China: Religionen und Kirchen. Statistischer Überblick
2011,”ChinaHeute 1 (2012): 26–38; and Fenggang Yang,Religion in China: Survival and Revival un-
der Communist Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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religions in China”7 makes it worthwhile as a subject to examine for those looking for
answers to today’s political problems in China, including whether liberalism is suit-
able for Chinese society.
In this article I examine the alternative China Model present in traditional
Daoist thought and its compatibility with Western ideas of political liberalism
by analyzing political ideas in the Dao De Jing (道德经; hereinafter DDJ) attributed
to Laozi (老子) vis-à-vis how these ideas are treated in John Stuart Mill’s On Lib-
erty.8 Following AndrewMarch’s guidelines, the DDJ andOn Liberty were selected
because of their positions as influential texts within their respective traditions.9
Providing advice to current and prospective political leaders on how to govern ef-
fectively, the DDJ, which was first compiled during China’s Warring States period
(475–221 BCE), is by far the most influential Daoist text and an influential text on
political thought in the East, holding a position there similar in stature to Ma-
chiavelli’sThe Prince in theWest.10 The aim of this exercise in comparative political
thought is to “point to parallel sensitivities”11 that may help to narrow the gap be-
tween Eastern and Western perspectives on freedom, and to reconsider whether
political thought traditions in China and the West are really as far apart as the
mainstream discourse contends.
While previous observers have noted that Laozi’s thought appears to have
economically or socially liberal qualities,12 I offer a systematic assessment of whether
Laozi also represents a Chinese variant of political liberalism. As discussed below,
7. Cheng-Tian Kuo, Religion and Democracy in Taiwan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of
New York Press, 2008), 60.
8. One of the world’s most translated books, the Dao De Jing (DDJ) (in pinyin translitera-
tion) is sometimes transliterated as the “Tao Te Ching.”
9. Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” Review of Politics 71 (2009):
531–65, at 556.
10. Jack Barbalet, “Market Relations as Wuwei: Daoist Concepts in Analysis of China’s
Post-1978 Market Economy,” Asian Studies Review 35 (2011): 335–54, at 336. See also Isabelle
Robinet, “The Diverse Interpretations of the Laozi,” in Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the
Laozi, ed. Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1999), 127–60.
11. Mario Wenning, “Kant and Daoism on Nothingness,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38
(2011): 556–68, at 557.
12. Barbalet, “Market Relations” (see note 10 above); Clarke, Tao of the West (see note 5
above); John J. Clarke, “Taoist Politics: An Other Way?” in Border Crossings: Toward a Com-
parative Political Theory, ed. Fred Dallmayr (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999), 253–76;
and Benjamin Schwartz, “The Thought of the Tao-te-ching,” in Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching,
ed. Livia Kohn and Michael Lafargue (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998),
189–228.
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while the two traditions of Daoism andWestern liberalism diverge in terms of advo-
cacy of popular representation and legal rights, they both reject authoritarianism and
seek to free humans from unwarranted restrictions imposed by the state, society, and
linguistic conventions (e.g., dominant discourses). Moreover, Daoism offers a unique
and arguably more expansive notion of liberty compared to many Western liberal-
isms, since it seeks to liberate not onlymen, but also women, people without property,
people from other countries, and non-human species. Hence, the article concludes
that an indigenous model of liberalism existed in China for centuries before the ad-
vent of Western liberalism.
Understanding Political Daoism
As Daniel Bell notes, “we need to understand China’s political values not only be-
cause they influence China but also because they influence much of the rest of the
world.”13 Doing so requires a historical perspective, since when it comes to the po-
litical ideologies that have shaped Chinese society, “the past . . . remains very much
a part of China’s present.”14 Yet whereas scholars have given much attention to the
potential links between Western liberal thinking and Confucianism over the past
few decades,15 they have examined the possibly liberal political content of Daoism
to a much lesser extent.
When it comes to liberal thought in China, Leigh Jenco has identified four chro-
nological strands of liberalism (自由主义, ziyou zhuyi)16 to have been influential in
China: a) during late Imperial China (the Qing dynasty, 1644–1911), b) in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, c) around theMay 4thmovement of 1919,
and d) during the period after the Cultural Revolution (1966–76).17 Additionally,
13. Daniel A. Bell, “Comparing Political Values in China and the West: What Can Be
Learned and Why It Matters,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017): 93–110, at 94.
14. Leigh Kathryn Jenco, “Chinese Political Ideologies,” in The Oxford Handbook of Polit-
ical Ideologies, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 644–60, at 645.
15. See, for example, Russell Arben Fox, “Confucian and Communitarian Responses to Lib-
eral Democracy,” Review of Politics 59 (1997): 561–92; Brooke A. Ackerly, “Is Liberalism the
Only Way Toward Democracy? Confucianism and Democracy,” Political Theory 33 (2005):
547–76; Tianjin Shi and Jie Lu, “The Shadow of Confucianism,” Journal of Democracy 21
(2010): 123–30; and Nicholas Spina, Doh Chull Shin, and Dana Cha, “Confucianism and De-
mocracy: A Review of the Opposing Conceptualizations,” Japanese Journal of Political Science
12 (2011): 143–60.
16. In this article, I include Chinese characters along with pinyin transliteration for terms
where the characters may not be easily discernible from pinyin.
17. Leigh Kathryn Jenco, “Chinese Liberalism,” in Encyclopedia of Political Theory, ed. Mark
Bevir (London: SAGE, 2010), 164–66. William DeBary’s work on late imperial China likewise
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I argue that a liberal (or at least proto-liberal) way of thinking about governance in
China emerged in the early Daoist writings of Laozi. Although scholars have not
paid much attention to this legacy, Jenco notes that “the word for ‘liberty’ in Chi-
nese, zi you (自由), literally translates as ‘do-as-you-will,’ evoking strong over-
tones of Daoist non-action beliefs.”18 Contempoary Daoist scholars within China
havemade this link as well. For instance, Li Gang has argued that “political Daoism”
(道治, daozhi) is a “liberal idea, and behavior orientationmodel in ancient China; its
idea of self-government by the people is another salient belief that the people are the
foundation of a nation.”19
In recent years, a number of Western scholars have also interpreted Daoism as
espousing a relatively liberal, self-directed, and autonomous mode of governance.20
Yet interpretations differ, in that scholars find Daoist texts variously supportive of
theocratic, anarchic, libertarian, and hybrid models of government. First, students
of the Daoist Canon (道藏, daozang) tend to see Daoist presciptions for governance
as paternalistic and based on a set of moral precepts to guide political and social
action, requiring exceptionally demanding talents, skills, and cultivated traits from
“sage” (圣人, shengren) political leaders.21 From this perspective, the ideal political
system might resemble a theocracy in which a well-attuned sage ruler guides their
community to live in harmony with the dao via their wise example and expert guid-
ance.22 The Scripture of Great Peace (太平经, taipingjing), for instance, envisions
the emperor as a moral leader who serves as a pivotal mediator between nature
and the masses, whereby “ordinary people being usually chaotic and ignorant
should concentrate their will on managing agricultural affairs” as opposed to en-
gaging in politics.23 Others go even further to argue that Daoism actually advocates
a manipulative form of government whereby a deceptive ruler pretends to be mod-
est, inactive, and uninvolved in people’s everyday affairs as a way of exercising
identifies elements of liberalism in Chinese thought. See William T. DeBary, The Liberal Tra-
dition in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
18. Jenco, “Chinese Liberalism,” 164 (see previous note).
19. Gang Li, Daozhi yu Ziyou (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2005), 4.
20. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Clarke, Tao of the West (see note 5 above); Livia
Kohn, Cosmos and Community: The Ethical Dimension of Daoism (Cambridge, Mass.: Three
Pines Press, 2004). Livia Kohn, Zhuangzi: Text and Context (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Three Pines
Press, 2014).
21. Kohn, Cosmos and Community (see previous note).
22. Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 101 (see note 5 above).
23. Kuo, Religion and Democracy, 59 (see note 7 above).
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hidden forms of social control.24 While such obscurantist interpretations may be
conceivable on the basis of some of the later manuscripts associated with Daoism
(especially those which began to emerge in the second century CE and which often
fuse Daoism with Confucianism or Legalism), these later texts admittedly diverge
from the classical Daoist texts of the Warring States period, which do not give
much support to such an interpretation. As Edward Slingerland notes, non-Daoist
thinkers such as Han Feizi were responsible for reducing wu-wei (non-action)
“from a spiritual ideal to amere administrative technique.”25 Similarly, in theWest,
the physiocratic theory of laissez-faire, which borrows the concept of wu-wei as a
market principle, oversimplifies and distorts core dimensions of this concept, in-
cluding the avoidance of excess.26 Likewise, Seungho Moon makes the case that
Daoism does not call for one to practice deceptivemanipulation of others, but rather
to “restrict his or her activities to what is needed and what is natural, not pursuing
actions motivated by self-interest.”27
In radical opposition to those seeing Daoist governance as a manipulative and
top-down affair, other scholars have interpreted early Daoist texts as favoring an-
archism.28 As John Rapp puts it, the “Daoist utopian vision is meant to serve as an
inspiration to reconstruct society from below in an anti-coercive fashion.”29 Like-
wise, Peter Zarrow finds early Daoism’s emphasis on non-coercion “clearly in line
with anarchist tendencies,” while acknowledging that “very little exists in com-
mon” between Daoism and “modern Western anarchism, with its emphasis on
24. This interpretation is usually associated with the Realist (or Legalist) school associated
with the classical Chinese thinker Hanfeizi, a school “concerned with the preservation of the
power of the state through adherence to law and political expediency.” See Benjamin Penny,
“Introduction,” in Laozi Daodejing, trans. Edmund Ryden (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), vii–xxix, at xxiii. See also Christopher C. Rand, “Chinese Military Thought and Philo-
sophical Taoism,” Monumenta Serica 34 (1979): 171–218.
25. Edward Slingerland, “Effortless Action: The Chinese Spiritual Ideal of Wu-wei,” Journal
of the American Academy of Religion 68 (2000): 293–327, at 297.
26. Barbalet, “Market Relations,” 347 (see note 10 above).
27. Seungho Moon, “Wuwei (non-action) Philosophy and Actions: Rethinking ‘Actions’ in
School Reform,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (2015): 455–73, at 460.
28. John A. Rapp, “Utopian, Anti-Utopian and Dystopian Ideas in Philosophical Daoism,”
Journal of Comparative Asian Development 2 (2003): 211–31; Bryan W. Van Norden, “Method
in the Madness of the Laozi,” in Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi, ed. Mark
Csikszentmihalyi and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999),
187–210.
29. John A. Rapp, Daoism and Anarchism: Critiques of State Autonomy in Ancient and
Modern China (New York: Continuum, 2012), 52.
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revolution.”30 In his view, “not only did Daoism clearly reject authoritarianism and
provide an image of a free society, but it also rooted this image in an understand-
ing of the individual as developing properly—naturally—only if free.”31
One perspective held among Confucian-inspired scholars is that Daoism as a
school of thought rejects modernity altogether in favor of people living in a “small
country with few inhabitants,” a phrase appearing only once in the DDJ.32 But
strong anti-modernist interpretations of the DDJ share three major shortcomings.
First, they often infer toomuch from a single isolated passage that appears nowhere
else in the text.33 Second, they fail to consider (in line with the general gist of the
whole DDJ), that the “small state” ideal may perhaps be best read as a critique of
authoritarian empire, expansionism, and the mindless adoption by the state of
(new) technologies of control that may turn out to ultimately have higher costs
than benefits to society—as opposed to a rejection of all forms of technology, public
administration, or statehood.34 Third, if one were to use such a passage to claim that
theDDJ therefore has little relevance tomodern society,35 that interpretation would
certainly also have to apply to other texts from its era, including those from the
Confucian school. For example, Confucius famously argued that one should stop
all public activities for three years in order to mourn a parent’s death, but it would
be too hasty to claim that texts from that school are irrelevant to today’s society
simply due to the fact that a modern economymay have difficulty functioning with
or adjusting to such extended employee leaves.
30. Peter Zarrow, Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1990), 6, 8.
31. Ibid., 11.
32. This phrase appears in Ch. 80. By contrast, renowned sinologist Joseph Needham tended
“to see the Daoist utopia through the lens of Marxist primitive communism rather than the lib-
ertarian individualism of certain nineteenth-century anarchists.” See Clarke, Tao of the West, 108
(see note 5 above).
33. Tongdong Bai, “How to Rule without Taking Unnatural Actions (无为而治): A Compar-
ative Study of the Political Philosophy of the Laozi,” Philosophy East & West 59 (2009): 481–
502, at 490.
34. As Zhongjiang Wang argues, Laozi’s ideal is not a “small country with few people.”
Rather, this passage is “an exposition of the ways by which rulers and social leaders can be least
involved and yet most efficient in managing people, society, and resources-no matter what size
the state is.” See Zhongjiang Wang, Daoism Excavated: Cosmos and Humanity in Early Man-
uscripts, trans. Livia Kohn (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Three Pines Press, 2015), 153.
35. See, for instance, D. C. Lau, trans., Tao Te Ching (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1963).
Similarly, Tongdong Bai argues, based on this passage, that “the romantic understanding of the
peaceful primitive life in the Laozi” is “highly problematic”; see Bai, “How to Rule,” 493 (see
note 33 above).
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What authors favoring an anarchic view correctly claim is that Daoism opposes
coercion and imperialism. However, these analysts too often mistakenly conflate
the anti-authoritarian sentiments of Laozi with anti-statism. Here it is important
to make a distiction between the writings of Laozi and Zhuangzi, another promi-
nent Daoist thinker whose writings emerged later (in the 4th to 3rd centuries BCE)
during China’s Warring States period. Zhuangzi is known, among other things, for
vividly expressing his contempt for certain aspects of officialdom. However, whereas
the work of Zhuangzi is often critical of government in general, the overriding focus
of Laozi is on statecraft and the practices of good government.36 Contesting the thesis
that Laozi’s thought is anarchic, there is now increasing consensus that Laozi sought
only a reduction of excessive state interference instead of a rejection of the state as a
whole.37 Earlier claims associating Laozi with anarchy were premised on the notion
that Laozi’s advocacy of wu-weimeant that rulers were simply to do nothing, essen-
tially implying the absence of any ruler, authority, or state. However, whereas anarchy
is a system that is ruler-less and stateless, Laozi endorses both the state and rulers and
“the Laozi is clearly a political treatise addressed to the ruler and providing himwith a
philosophy of governance.”38 Moreover, the Daoist sage ruler is not one who does
nothing, but one who does nothing that goes against the dao.39 As Aleksandar
Stamatov argues, “the Laozi suggests a kind of interaction between the ruler and
the ruled. It means that the ruler acts on the people but the people can also act on
the ruler, and the actions of the ruler can be determined by the people.”40 Or to
put it differently, “the top and the bottom are in a relation of mutual interaction,
and this is not the anarchist ideal.”41
36. Clarke, “Taoist Politics” (see note 12 above); Russell Kirkland, “Self-Fulfillment through
Selflessness: The Moral Teachings of the Daode Jing,” in Varieties of Ethical Reflection: New Di-
rections for Ethics in a Global Context, ed. Michael Barnhart (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books,
2002), 21–48; and Alex Feldt, “Governing through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation
of the Laozi,” Dao 9 (2010): 323–37.
37. See Feldt, “Governing through the Dao” (see previous note); Aleksandar Stamatov, “The
Laozi and Anarchism,” Asian Philosophy 24 (2014): 260–78; and Wang, Daoism Excavated (see
note 34 above).
38. Feldt, “Governing through the Dao,” 327 (see note 36 above).
39. Stamatov, “The Laozi,” 270, 275 (see note 37 above). As Alex Feldt points out, although
“the ruler does not maintain an active hand in daily governance, he never absolves himself of
the power to institute policy and structural changes necessary to facilitate society’s accordance
with the dao on a broader level.” See Feldt, “Governing through the Dao,” 324 (see note 36
above).
40. Stamatov, “The Laozi,” 266 (see note 37 above).
41. Ibid., 271.
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In fact, leading scholars have even contested the idea that anarchy is champi-
oned by Zhuangzi. Whereas statecraft and non-confrontational governance are
heavily emphasized by Laozi, Zhuangzi champions playfulness and uselessness in
his narratives. For instance, he exults the Peng bird and other figures “who are truly
themselves, unconventional, eccentric,”42 presumably because they are completely
free from the rigidity and rules of society—in other words, because they live in an-
archy. Nevertheless, Livia Kohn argues that while Zhuangzi may be anarchic in a
linguistic sense, he is no political anarchist. As Kohn points out, while Zhuangzi
was personally uninterested in working for the government and was disgusted by
political maneuvering, the sage ruler envisioned by Zhuangzi (like that of Laozi)
is one who takes action to support people’s flourishing: “If a great sage were to gov-
ern the world, he would let people’s minds be easy and open, to have them create
their own teachings and change their customs as needed. He would support them
in eliminating all mental negativity and help them progress in realizing their unique
ambitions.”43
In a related vein, the idea that the state should not dominate or excessively in-
terfere with people’s lives has led to comparisons between Daoism and libertarian-
ism, especially since Daoism provides a justification for creating and supporting a
government that is limited in scope.44 But as Moon notes, the Daoist state and its
ruler are not completely passive and indifferent to people’s selfish desires. While
Laozi may advocate a relatively gentle and non-abrasive approach to governance,
his aim is to provide support to the population and curb people’s aggression, desire,
and dissatisfaction:
Laozi put forward wu-wei (non-action) as a political idea, which means
the rulers or the leaders must be generous with the people and make the min-
imum interference or intervention in people’s lives; . . . wu-wei highlighted a
sage leader’s roles of governing the statewith soft,minimal intervention, humil-
ity, and in a spontaneous manner, which is cultivating life and leadership in
accordance with Tao . . . . Making people non-aggressive, content, and desire-
free is a political strategy in Taoism that is different from Confucianism.45
42. Kohn, Zhuangzi, 223 (see note 20 above).
43. Ibid., 64.
44. Clarke, Tao of the West, 256–57 (see note 5 above); see also Feldt, “Governing through
the Dao” (see note 36 above).
45. Moon, “Wuwei,” 457 (see note 27 above).
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As Liu Xiaogan points out, “the agent of wu-wei in Laozi’s theory is essentially the
sage, or leader of society, who takes ‘assisting’ as the key principle of action in-
stead of directly ordering, pushing, interfering, and interrupting.”46 Thus, Laozi’s
sages are probably not libertarian, as they work towards helping the people as op-
posed to just refraining from harming them. This inference is also consonant with
the DDJ ’s insistence that both sides in any pair of opposites (for example, male
and female, light and dark, active and passive, strong and weak, state and society)
have their own virtues and that one should not dogmatically champion any one
side to the exclusion of the other.47
Taking these observations regarding limitations in theocratic, anarchic, and
libertarian intepretations of the DDJ into consideration, I will now advance the
argument that Laozi’s thought can be fruitfully understood as a particular Chi-
nese model or variety of liberalism, since many core ideas behind contemporary
Western liberalisms appear compatible with Laozi’s thought. As liberals are wont
to argue, the goal of achieving a non-coercive social order can be achieved by trans-
forming the state rather than eliminating or minimizing it. While Western liberals
tend to advocate freedom above most other objectives, instead of taking an anti-
statist view, they see the proper role of the state as advancing some combination
of the following three freedoms: freedom from constraints and harm; autonomy,
or the freedom to be an author of one’s own life; and freedom of thought, belief,
and conscience.48 As discussed below, Laozi’s thought seems to favor all three.49
Comparing Laozi and J. S. Mill’s On Liberty
Espousing a holistic philosophy, Laozi’s thought speaks to multiple dimensions of
life, since it conceives the “dao” (道; often translated as “way”) as “the unname-
able source of generative vitality in a universe of constant transformation.”50
46. Xiaogan Liu, “Daoism: Laozi and Zhuangzi,” in The Oxford Handbook of World Philos-
ophy, ed. Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47–
57, at 50.
47. Hansen, A Daoist Theory (see note 20 above).
48. Kazuo Seiyama, Liberalism: Its Achievements and Failures (Melbourne, Australia: Trans
Pacific Press, 2010), 142–46.
49. As Feldt argues, in Laozi’s vision “the state will attempt to operate in a manner that al-
lows as much freedom as possible for the people.” See Feldt, “Governing through the Dao,” 335
(see note 36 above).
50. James Miller, “Daoism and Development,” in Handbook of Research on Development
and Religion, ed. Matthew Clarke (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2013), 113–123, at 113.
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According to Wang Zhongjiang, the dao is “formless, imageless, nameless, simple,
and subtle,” and its “most beautiful virtue” is that it “does not exercise any form of
manipulation or control over the myriad beings, but lets them develop and unfold
as they will.”51 As Slingerland argues, “for the pre-Qin Confucians and Daoists, the
culmination of knowledge is represented by an ability to move through the world
and human society in a manner that is completely spontaneous and yet still fully in
harmony with the normative order of the natural and human worlds—the Dao
or ‘Way.’ ”52
Nevertheless, scholars have offered differing interpretations of Laozi’s thought
due to the polysemic and protean nature of the DDJ. The first line of the DDJ con-
tributes to such perplexity by stating “the Dao that can be spoken of is not the eter-
nal Dao,” a theme expounded upon in Chapter 21: “Dao is something elusive and
vague! . . . Though elusive and vague, in it is the substance.”53 Making use of such
passages, rival Confucians have maneuvered over the past twomillennia to portray
Laozi’s thought as esoteric andobscure. Yet the historical record shows that “the fusion
of politics and religion has been a strong tradition in Daoism,”54 andmany later Dao-
ists inspired by Laozi’s thought were important figures in the high politics of China
during the Early Han (206 BCE–24 CE), Jin (266–420 CE), Wei (386–534 CE),
and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties.55
Here I assess whether the spirit of Laozi’s thought offers something akin to a
Chinese model of liberalism. I begin by discussing five core political principles
prominent in the DDJ and the treatment of each of these principles in John Stuart
Mill’sOn Liberty. Mill’sOn Liberty is a classic pronouncement of Western political
liberalism. As one scholar notes, it represents “the single most eloquenty, most sig-
nificant, and most influential statement of the irreducible value of human individ-
uality . . . . Insofar as liberalism in the modern world could be said to acknowledge
one text as setting out its essential moral basis, several generations of readers have
51. Wang, Daoism Excavated, 146, 151 (see note 34 above).
52. Slingerland, “Effortless Action,” 295 (see note 25 above).
53. DDJ quotations in this article are taken from translations by Paul J. Lin, A Translation of
Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching and Wang Pi’s Commentary (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Cen-
ter for Chinese Studies, 1977) and Zhengkun Gu, Laozi: Dao De Jing (Beijing, China: Beijing
Daxue Chubanshe, 1995).
54. Yang, “The Changing Economy,” 142 (see note 5 above).
55. Clarke, Tao of the West (see note 5 above); Russell Kirkland, Taoism: The Enduring Tra-
dition (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
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concurred in according that primacy to On Liberty.”56 While no single spokesper-
son or text can encapsulate the diversity of theWestern liberal tradition,On Liberty
clarifies the three core concepts of liberal ideology: “for liberty, it is the notion of
non-constraint; for individualism, the notion of the person as a separate entity pos-
sessing unique attributes and capable of choice; for progress, the notion of move-
ment from less desirable to more desirable states.”57 Importantly, Mill also stands
out as a thinker who operated at the intersection of different cross-currents of
(traditional and revisionist) liberal thought while posessing a remarkable ability
“to hold together conflicting elements in liberal thought.”58 Mill was also self-
consciously a liberal contributing to liberal thought as a writer and practitioner. He
was a member of Parliament for the Liberal party in nineteenth-century Britain,
an era in which liberalism was ascendant (post-1815) and prior to liberalism’s “his-
toric compromise with democracy” (post-1880) and its later stress on “personal
rights” (post-1945).59
As an exercise in comparative political thought,60 this study takes a “contextu-
alizing concepts”61 approach by first identifying prominent politically oriented
concepts in the DDJ and then comparing these concepts with their corresponding
treatment in J. S. Mill’s work in order to assess the presence of conceptual family
resemblances.62 The aim here is to overcome unconscious prejudices63 and identify
56. Stefan Collini, “Introduction” in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty with The Subjection of
Women and Chapters of Socialism, ed. Stefan Collini (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1989), vii–xxvi, at vii.
57. Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford, U.K.:
Clarendon Press, 1996), 145.
58. Fawcett, Liberalism, 88 (see note 1 above). This article’s focus on J. S. Mill as one par-
ticular representative of Western liberalism does not intend to diminish the important contri-
butions of other influential liberal thinkers such as John Locke, Adam Smith, Thomas Hill (T. H.)
Green, or Richard Titmuss.
59. Ibid., 2, 11. By contrast, earlier thinkers who made significant contributions to liberal
thinking like Adam Smith and John Locke can be seen to some degree as proto-liberals who
lived prior to the post-Napoleonic era when liberalism finally emerged as an influential political
practice and ideology.
60. On the field of comparative political thought, see Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent,
“Introduction: The Study of Comparative Political Thought,” in Comparative Political Thought:
Theorizing Practices, ed. Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent (New York: Routledge, 2013),
1–23; James Tully, “Deparochializing Political Theory and Beyond: A Dialogue Approach to
Comparative Political Thought,” Journal of World Philosophies 1 (2016): 51–74.
61. Adrian Little, “Contextualizing Concepts: The Methodology of Comparative Political
Theory,” Review of Politics 80 (2018): 87–113, at 89.
62. Melissa S. Williams and Mark E. Warren, “A Democratic Case for Comparative Political
Theory,” Political Theory 42 (2014): 26–57, at 55–56.
63. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 369, 414.
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“correlations between concepts in different cases rather than direct translations.”64
This approach can be understood as “a kind of dialogue” that “opens up the pos-
sibility of widening our range of sympathies and multiplying the conceptual tools
at our disposal.”65 Since themeaning one derives from a text always depends on one’s
own thought-world and the conversation into which the text is brought, this dia-
logue serves to illuminate liberal elements in Daoist thought while also potentially
compelling us “to confront assumptions, limitations, and fractures” of theWestern
liberal tradition.66
While the foregoing analysis is primaily conventional in nature by privileging
written texts, Jenco has demonstrated that practices of living communities them-
selves constitute political thinking, and that “political theory appears not only in
places that self-consciously articulate it but also in an array of modes that cele-
brate, commemorate and transmit it.”67 Hence, since texts and practice often
“exist in a complementary relationship,” the comparative textual analysis that
follows is supplemented by a few brief observations of “local experiences within
a living tradition,”68 namely reflections by scholars on political and ritual prac-
tices carried out by contemporary Daoist communities in the Republic of China
on Taiwan.
In my analysis, I concentrate only on political themes reiterated in multiple chap-
ters of the DDJ in order to avoid unduly over-weighting isolated passages or themes
that appear only once in a text that itself may be a multi-authored compendium.69
Lastly, my focus is on how Laozi’s thought relates to the concept of “liberalism”
and not the more complicated multi-conceptual cluster of “liberal democracy,” since
these are independent concepts; some regimes may be liberal but undemocratic or
democratic but illiberal.70 In the article’s conclusion, however, I compare several
64. Little, “Contextualizing Concepts,” 112 (see note 61 above).
65. Clarke, Tao of the West, 10, 13 (see note 5 above).
66. Ibid., 12.
67. Leigh Kathryn Jenco, “ ‘What Does Heaven Ever Say?’ A Methods-Centered Approach
to Cross-Cultural Engagement,” American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 741–55, at 752.
68. Ibid., 753.
69. Kirkland, “Self-Fulfillment,” 25 (see note 36 above). My analysis is based on the trans-
mitted version of the DDJ over the past two millennia, as opposed to the more recently discov-
ered but long-buried Mawangdui and Guodian texts. Studies of the latter include Robert G.
Henricks, Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-
Wang-Tui Texts (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989); Edmund Ryden, Laozi Daodejing: A
New Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Wang, Daoism Excavated (see note 34
above).
70. T. F. Rhoden, “The Liberal in Liberal Democracy,” Democratization 22 (2015): 560–78.
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aspects of Laozi’s thought with what in recent years has been termed “democracy
with Chinese characteristics.”
Political Principles in Laozi’s Dao De Jing
A core political principle prominent in Laozi’s thought is its call for non-coercive
means of governing society as expressed through the term wu-wei (無為), which is
translated variously as “effortless non-calculative responsiveness,”71 “effortless ac-
tion,”72 or “non-coerceive action.”73 While sometimes translated as non-action,
wu-wei does not mean taking no action at all. Rather, “it describes a state of per-
sonal harmony in which actions flow freely and instantly from one’s spontaneous
inclinations—without the need for extended deliberation or inner struggle—and
yet nonetheless perfectly accord with the dictates of the situation at hand.”74 As
Lesley Prince explains, “when one is fully connected with the ebb and flow of what
is happening in the environment, then action can become spontaneously appropri-
ate to the prevailing circumstances.”75
Since Daoist rulers are expected to follow the way of nature (天之道, tian zhi
dao), “which is invariably in a state of flux,”76 this frequently requires political lead-
ers to refrain frommaking hasty social interventions and to retreat into meditation
(心斋, xinzhai), stillness (坐忘, zuowang), and reflection in order to discern or in-
tuit nature’s objectives before (or instead of ) taking action. The imperative of wu-
wei also means a ruler should avoid using coercion, violence, confrontation, strong
compulsion, and excessive force to achieve their objectives.77 As A. C. Graham
notes, in order to practicewu-wei “the essential thing is not to interfere when things
are already running by themselves.”78 Multiple passages of the DDJ reiterate this
core principle of political rule, as illustrated in the following excerpts:
71. Eric Sean Nelson, “Responding with Dao: Early Daoist Ethics and the Environment,”
Philosophy East and West 59 (2009): 294–316, at 296.
72. Slingerland, “Effortless Action,” 293 (see note 25 above).
73. Roger T. Ames and David Hall, Laozi Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation (New
York: Ballantine, 2003).
74. Slingerland, “Effortless Action,” 300 (see note 25 above).
75. Lesley Prince, “Eating the Menu Rather than the Dinner: Tao and Leadership,” Leader-
ship 1 (2005): 105–126, at 117.
76. Shelton Gunaratne, The Dao of the Press: A Humanocentric Theory (Cresskill, N.J.:
Hampton Press, 2005), 26.
77. Li, Daozhi yu Ziyou, 5 (see note 18 above).
78. A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (Chicago,
Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 232.
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The Sage administers without action and instructs without words. He lets
all things rise without dominating them, produces without attempting to
possess, acts without asserting, achieves without taking credit.79
One does things noncoercively and yet nothing goes undone.80
To govern the world well, one must take wu wei as the principle. If one gov-
erns with too much action, one is not a worthy governor.81
Authoritarian styles of governance, by contrast, can be seen as the opposite of
wu-wei, and Laozi repeatedly denounces political leaders who dominate every as-
pect of people’s lives through excessive extractions, interventions, and prohibi-
tions. For instance, the DDJ tells us that:
To rule a large nation is as to cook a small fish, that is by not disturbing it.82
Do not restrict their living quarters. Do not disturb their livelihood. Just be-
cause one does not annoy them, he will not be annoyed by them.83
The people are starving because theman on top devours toomuch taxmoney,
so they are starving.84
Instead Laozi advocates having a ruler who does not demand too much from the
population (for example, in taxes, conformity, interventions, or prohibitions). This
suggests the DDJ opposes governance methods by which rulers control the popula-
tion through means of deliberate violence, manipulative propaganda, and crippling
restrictions on permissible behavior. Berating rulers who excessively restrict the pop-
ulation’s movements and activities, Laozi advocates a more hands-off approach, such
that people may not even be aware of who the ruler is. In his view, “the best ruler
is unknown to his subjects; Next comes the ruler loved and praised; Next comes the
ruler being feared; Next comes the ruler disdained.”85
Similarly, John Stuart Mill condemns authoritarianism and champions liberty
in terms of “protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.”86 He likewise
79. DDJ, ch. 2 (see note 53 above).
80. Ibid., ch. 37. The Chinese characters here are 道常无为而无不为.
81. Ibid., ch. 48.
82. Ibid., ch. 60.
83. Ibid., ch. 72.
84. Ibid., ch. 75.
85. Ibid., ch. 17.
86. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty with the Subjection of Women
and Chapters on Socialism, ed. Stefan Collini (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989
[1859]), 1–115, at 5.
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advocates limits on the scope of government to prevent it from having excessive
power and control over society.87 Mill squarely rejects totalitarianism and micro-
managing of other people’s lives, believing that the liberty of individuals should in-
clude conscience and opinion, tastes and pursuits, and the freedom to unite.88 Ac-
cording to Mill, “the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”89 As a possible corollary to the idea of
wu-wei, Mill expresses the conviction that “the only acceptable ground for interfering
with an individual’s activities is that they are likely to produce definite harm to some
identifiable other person or persons.”90 Thus, bothMill and Laozi call for less state in-
terference in people’s lives and by implication a space for individuality and civil society
to develop.
Simplicity, modesty, and contentment form a second political principle of Laozi
as expressed by the term zu (足) (sufficiency, contentment). Rulers are to lead a
simple, content, and non-extravagant life without desire (無欲, wu yu). By living
without ego, greed, surplus, or excess, leaders can serve as role models for the pop-
ulation. In Laozi’s thought, simplicity, frugality, andmodesty are considered riches,
whereas accumulation of excess and wastefulness are errant. As the DDJ warns,
“No crime is greater than greediness; No disaster is greater than the lack of content-
ment; Thus, the contentment of feeling content is an eternal contentment.”91 For
Laozi, the proper role of government is to make people’s lives more secure without
demanding too much in terms of prohibitions, taboos, levies, and conscriptions.
Hence, simplicity is both a means and an end of good governance, and the quality
of governance is heavily impacted by those at the top because they set the tone for
the rest of society. If they are full of desires, so will be the masses.
This theme also occurs in a passage from Chapter 3 of the DDJ, which states
that “the Daoist sage causes (shi使) the masses to be without knowledge (cunning)
or desires by keeping their hearts vacuous, filling their bellies, weakening their
ambitions, and strengthening their bones.”92 While some argue this means that
Laozi intends for the masses to be made ignorant and under-educated, such an in-




90. Collini, “Introduction,” xiv (see note 55 above).
91. DDJ, ch. 6 (see note 52 above). The characters for the phrase in italics are知足之足常足矣;
emphasis added.
92. Bai, “How to Rule,” 484 (see note 33 above).
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spontaneity, and being in harmony with nature. An interpretation that is perhaps
more in line with the DDJ ’s broader narrative is that rulers ought to place a high
priority onmaking sure that their people are sufficiently nourished, fit, and healthy,
and that this should should take precedence over saturating the population with
propaganda and inciting them to desire luxuries. As Mario Wenning notes, the
Daoist leader aims for each person in society “to follow a path of creative doing rather
than to impose his or her will through instrumental action on the world.”93 Thus,
rather than advocating a cruel leader or austere living, a primary objective of the text
may be to express visceral opposition to the hypocrisy of contrived “virtues” and the
problems of social indoctrination and elite manipulations that lead people (in
Laozi’s view) to be greedy, aggressive, materialistic, and violent—hence leading to
war, chaos, and disruption.
Laozi remains convinced that when rulers are without desire, in contrast to the
typical ruler of his (and perhaps our) era, there will be good governance and the
masses will become simple and content. This theme appears in multiple passages:
Discern plainness. Embrace simplicity. Reduce selfishness. Restrain desires.94
The Sage abandons the excessive, the extravagant, and the extreme.95
To be content is riches.96
Nameless simplicity means being without desires. Being without desires
and with tranquility, the world will keep peace by itself.97
Overhoarding brings heavy loss. To know what is enough means to avoid
disgrace.98
The sage knows himself but does not praise himself; loves himself but does
not honor himself.99
By contrast, simplicity and frugality are not major themes in Mill’s On Liberty.
Mill puts much greater emphasis on reducing harm to people than reducing their
desires or consumption. However, Mill does note that “the superior worth of
92. Bai, “How to Rule,” 484 (see note 33 above).
93. Wenning, “Kant and Daoism,” 564 (see note 11 above).
94. DDJ, ch. 19 (see note 53 above).
95. Ibid., ch. 29.
96. Ibid., ch. 33.
97. Ibid., ch. 37.
98. Ibid., ch. 44.
99. Ibid., ch. 72.
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simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralizing effect of the trammels and hypoc-
rises of artificial society, are ideas which . . . at present are needing to be asserted as
much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly
exhausted their power.”100 Thus, while seemingly not a top priority forMill, hemay
have been sympathetic to this particular goal. For instance,Mill was clearly suppor-
tive of imposing taxes, licenses, and in certain cases restrictions (but generally not
total prohibitions) on things that are harmful, which one can see as compatible
with the Daoist idea of curbing desire (wu yu). As Mill states,
It is hence the duty of the State to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what
commodities the consumers can best spare . . . . Taxation, therefore, of stim-
ulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue . . . is
not only admissible, but to be approved of.101
Thus, the reduction of desire receives much stronger emphasis in the DDJ than in
Mill’s On Liberty, but where a sense of compatability does arise between the two
thinkers is that both take as their units of analysis not only the freedom of the in-
dividual but also liberty in society as a whole, since the two are interlinked, thereby
requiring both individuals and society to exercise some degree of self-restraint so
that others can experience freedom as well.
A third core political principle of Laozi is pursuing peace and non-violence in
domestic and international affairs. TheDDJ repeatedly calls on leaders tominimize
the use of force and to refrain from the use of armies andweapons as instruments of
violence.102 In Laozi’s day, “due to wars and conquests, the rulers . . . had to rule
directly over states that kept becoming larger and more populous, and the survival
of these states depended upon their success in war,” whereas for Daoists, the nat-
ural life is one where “human beings are born, mature, age, and die, but they are not
killed in a conflict caused by greed.”103 In this context, Laozi resolutely championed
nonviolence, seeing war as something best to avoid and only to be undertaken as
a last resort.104
The DDJ also strongly opposes vicious and duplicitous rulers who incite vio-
lence and vice in the population: “When the people possess many sharp weapons,
100. Mill, On Liberty, 101 (see note 86 above).
101. Ibid., 101.
102. Clarke, “Taoist Politics” (see note 12 above).
103. Bai, “How to Rule,” 489, 484 (see note 33 above).
104. Ellen Y. Zhang, “Weapons are Nothing but Ominous Instruments: The Daodejing’s
View on War and Peace,” Journal of Religious Ethics 40 (2002): 473–502.
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the nation will become more chaotic. When the people possess much craftiness,
trickery will flourish. When law and order become more conspicuous, there will
be more robbers and thieves.”105 Here theDDJ is condemning the hypocrisy of rulers
who promote law and order to keep the peace through harsh punishments while con-
versely denying people the necessary opportunities and conditions needed for mean-
ingfully living—a strategy that Laozi sees as destined to backfire. This view is aired in
multiple passages, such as:
Those who aid the ruler with Dao do not use military force to conquer the
world. Because this will invite retaliation. Where the army stays, briers and
thorns grow. After a great war comes the year of adversity.106
Weapons are the tools of evil, not the tools of the gentleman.107
The state’s sharp weapons cannot be shown to the people.108
When a country goes counter to the Dao, warheads are stockpiled outside
the cities.109
By contrast, peace in international and domestic affairs is not heavily empha-
sized in On Liberty, but Mill argues in a similar vein, and forcefully, that progress
does not and should not come at the expense of order. Rather, he believed both
must be pursued simultaneously, implying a rejection of violent conflicts and up-
heavals since they threaten order. In Mill’s view, “Order, thus considered, is not an
additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress it-
self. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same
or in any other, there is not Progress.”110 Mill similarly spoke out against the abuse
of state power and “utterly repudiated any suggestion of a violent seizure of power.”111
Like the DDJ, Mill’s conception of the ideal society was radically different from the
status quo in his era, but he rejected violent revolutionary means to realize it. Instead,
Mill believed the state ought to stop fraud, treachery, and force.112 These ideas clearly
resonate with those expressed in the DDJ.
105. DDJ, ch. 57 (see note 53 above).
106. Ibid., ch. 30.
107. Ibid., ch. 31.
108. Ibid., ch. 36.
109. Ibid., ch. 46.
110. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1958 [1861]), 22.
111. Collini, “Introduction,” xxiv (see note 56 above).
112. Mill, On Liberty, 95 (see note 8 above).
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A fourth core political principle in Laozi’s thought is naturalness as expressed in
the mantra that “the daomodels itself on self-being.”113 Naturalness (自然, zi ran),
which literally means so-of-itself, relates to people “following their inner natures”
or “returning to nature.”114 This refers to each individual having their own unique
“heaven-given inherent nature” and “being allowed to unfold freely into whoever
they are” in a spontaneous manner, as opposed to rigidly following socially con-
structed norms.115 It is the opposite of following artificial, man-made, socially con-
trived principles, and it designates liberation for all life forms from constricting
social strictures. As Sharon Rowe explains, Daoism “mocks any point of view
that accords humans privilege among nature’s myriad creatures, suggesting that
it is the height of folly to believe humans can control nature.”116 Instead of dominat-
ing other species, people should live in harmony with the natural environment.117
This entails avoiding the use of unnecessary, wasteful, or destructive products
and technologies and making sure the human population does not outgrow the re-
sources needed to sustain itself. As Eric Nelson argues,
Instead of ethical and social life being based on the domination of nature, in
which it is transformed into an instrumental object of calculation and con-
trol . . . the Daodejing suggests that the ruler rules best without force and
violence. Nature and society are not divided into unconnected opposites,
and their mutuality implies that harming one equally harms the other.118
The Daoist principle of respecting nature likewise entails appreciating the value
of females and feminine energies for achieving peace and harmony, as mentioned
in the following passages:
113. Wang, Daoism Excavated, 130 (see note 34 above).
114. Moon, “Wuwei,” 458 (see note 27 above).
115. Wang, Daoism Excavated, 143, 135 (see note 34 above). As Liu Xiaogan notes, natu-
ralness “is the highest principle and core value” of Laozi’s philosophy, and is “embodied and
promoted by Dao. The true meaning and message . . . . is that humans should put the principle
of naturalness into practice and engage in natural harmony in their lives and with their sur-
roundings. Natural harmony and natural order are valuable and desirable compared with either
forced order or chaos.” See Liu, “Daoism: Laozi and Zhuangzi,” 49–50 (see note 46 above).
116. Sharon Rowe, “Returning to What Matters: Daoist Lessons for Ecofeminisms,” Inter-
national Research in Geographical and Environmental Education 11 (2002): 63–67, at 64.
117. The Daoist thinker Zhuangzi arguably goes even further than Laozi in his advocacy of
bio-centrism or eco-centrism as opposed to anthropocentrism. See Kohn, Zhuangzi, 245 (see
note 20 above).
118. Nelson, “Responding with Dao,” 305 (see note 7 above).
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The Valley Spirit never dies. It is called the mystic female. The door of the
mystic female is the root of heaven and earth.119
When male and female combine, all things achieve harmony.120
The female always conquers the male by serenity.121
In this respect, the DDJ not only expresses the idea that through the act of yield-
ing the weak can overcome the strong,122 it also sets itself apart from other texts of
its era by not advocating and even subtly contesting patriarchy and gender hier-
archy in encouraging leaders to take on feminine leadership qualities.123
Similarly, J. S. Mill was one of the fewmen publicly challenging patriarchy in his
era by insisting “very vigorously that women should not suffer any legal penalties as
a result of getting married (such as loss of control over their own property), and
should not be excluded from any careers or offices. He also explicitly and unreserv-
edly affirmed women’s right to vote in all national and local elections.”124 While
Mill was generally silent on society-nature relations, he did encourage humans
to be free to give way to certain natural impulses and to spontaneity.125 Mill also
rejected the idea that “trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards,
or cut out into figures of animals, than as nature made them.”126 Rather, he argued
“it is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but
by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and
interests of others” that human life “becomes rich, diversified, and animating.”127
And resembling the rythmic alternations of nature (between seasons, day and
night, growth and decay, etc.) as expressed in the DDJ, Mill likewise advocated
rythmic alternation and two-party balance within liberal democracy:
In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stabil-
ity, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a
healthy state of political life . . . . Each of these modes of thinking derives
its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the
119. DDJ, ch. 6 (see note 53 above).
120. Ibid., ch. 42.
121. Ibid., ch. 61.
122. Graham, “Disputers,” 229–30 (see note 78 above).
123. Kirkland, Taoism, 126–33 (see note 55 above); and Clarke, “Taoist Politics,” 265–66
(see note 12 above).
124. Collini, “Introduction,” xix (see note 56 above).
125. Mill, On Liberty, 58 (see note 86 above).
126. Ibid., 62.
127. Ibid., 63.
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opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity.
Unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and
to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence,
to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other
standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom,
and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance
of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other
down.128
Finally, a fifth core political principle of Laozi is embracing discursive pluralism,
a principle connected to Daoists’ fundamental skepticism towards all forms of lan-
guage.129 Positing that the myriad beings (萬物, wanwu) each have their own na-
ture, Laozi’s thought also proposes an ontological pluralism which is readily ob-
servable in Laozi’s “dialectical or paradoxical thinking, in which the unity and
transformation of pairs of contradictions are a basic operating principle” as ex-
pressed through “the interdependence between opposite things and concepts.”130
This starting points leads us to acknowledge the partiality and contingency of all
names, labels, concepts, and categories. As the DDJ expresses it, “The name that
can be mentioned is not the eternal name.”131
Conscious that words, language, and knowledge are always partial, relative, and
open to interpretation, skepticism of language implies allowing space for plural and
dissenting views that may challenge dominant discourses.132 Laozi also seems to
frown upon modes of governance that foster self-censorship: “When a country is
in disorder, there are loyal ministers.”133 As John Clarke points out, Daoism exudes
“an air of gentle toleration and a spirit of openness and compromise” that encour-
ages “a questioning of moral fundamentalisms and totalizing perspectives” while
fostering the “blossoming of a tolerant pluralism of values.”134What Laozi is calling
for is a release from being saddled with or befuddled by conventional notions of
what is and should be—an idea that ties in directly with the aforementioned con-
cept of wu-wei.
128. Ibid., 48.
129. Hansen, A Daoist Theory, 203 (see note 20 above).
130. Liu, “Daoism: Laozi and Zhuangzi,” 50 (see note 46 above); see also Wang, Daoism
Excavated, 116 (see note 34 above).
131. DDJ, ch. 1 (see note 53 above).
132. Similarly, Zhuangzi “insists on multiple perspectives, and bemoans the limitations of
culture and ordinary knowledge”; see Kohn, Zhuangzi, 224 (see note 20 above).
133. DDJ, ch. 18 (see note 53 above).
134. Clarke, “Taoist Politics,” 270 (see note 12 above).
572 | The Other China Model
On this point one can see considerable convergence with the liberalism of Mill,
who held a similar position in advocating for a pluralism of ideas, by arguing,
“there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they
attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have
the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood.”135 Just as Laozi asserts
there are multiple ways of interpreting reality, Mill emphasized paying attention
to more than one perspective: “If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion,
and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be nomore jus-
tified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
silencing mankind.”136
Mill also heavily emphasized relativity, as did the DDJ. In Mill’s view, popular
opinions “are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the
truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted,
and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited.
Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and
neglected truths.”137 In this respect, Mill’s popular and heretical opinions resemble
the ancient Chinese concepts of yin and yang (featured in the DDJ), each of which
complements the other, but alone does not contain the whole story.138 Here Mill
noticeably places greater emphasis on discussion among different viewpoints to ar-
rive at truths compared to Daoists, who are wont to see meditation, contemplation,
and mysticism as primary routes to reach the deep truths of life. But Laozi’s crit-
icism of rectified language and advocacy for tolerance necessarily opens a space
for pluralism as likewise advocated by Mill.
Reconciling Laozi’s Thought and Mill’s Liberalism
Both Laozi and John Stuart Mill saw their respective societies and states as overly
aggressive, harmful, stifling, and conformist. They also sought to reduce unwarranted
meddling and intrusion by the state into people’s lives in order to allow them to live
more naturally, spontaneously, and freely. Thus, I have identified a significant cor-
relation between the two thinkers in terms of a desirable political outcome—that
of humans being free, which can be succinctly described as substantive liberalism.
135. Mill, On Liberty, 53 (see note 86 above).
136. Ibid., 20.
137. Ibid., 47.
138. Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 20 (see note 5 above); L. H. M. Ling, “Worlds be-
yond Westphalia: Daoist Dialectics and the ‘China Threat,’” Review of International Studies 39
(2013): 549–68, at 560.
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Interestingly, both thinkers also hint at the notion that self-cultivation is an ultimate
purpose of human life. Yet for Laozi, the goal is to return to a state of being in har-
mony with nature, while for Mill the goal is to move forward and achieve progress,
although both luminaries see an overweening, excessively domineering and interfer-
ing state as a primary obstacle to achieving these goals. While they do not share iden-
tical goals, to borrow JohnRawls’s term, there is a substantial “overlapping consensus”
between them.139
Where divergence between Mill and Laozi is more pronounced is over which
procedures will achieve greater liberty for humans from their rulers and social con-
ventions. On this measure, Laozi calls for a highly cultivated sage ruler who prac-
tices wu-wei, whereas Mill calls for two things: popular representation as a source
of collective intelligence to check government abuse and as a source of alternative
ideas to be publicly contested; and legal rights that limit the state’s powers to in-
fringe on human liberties. I now consider whether these notions of rights and rep-
resentation (i.e., procedural liberalism) can be commensurable with Laozi’s thought.
While both Laozi and Western liberalism convey the message that people de-
serve protection from arbitrary powers of the state, a major difference between
the two is that Western liberals commonly appeal to the legal concept of rights, a
concept absent in the DDJ, which predated the development of global rights con-
sciousness by over two millennia. Western liberals also tend to champion the rule
of law concept, whereby states can only punish citizens through due procedures (in-
cluding a right to appeal) if they have been found guilty of criminal behavior. At first
glance, Laozi’s emphasis on harmony appears to diverge from themore competitive,
adversarial, and institutionalized orientation of Western liberalism. It also seems
that Laozi would be opposed to hard and fast legal rights because of the indetermi-
nacy of both language and the way. However, legal rights guaranteed to individuals
that restrict the scope of state actions that might otherwise harm them or arbitrarily
act against them are certainly compatible with Laozi’s imperative of non-coercion in
the same way that Western liberals champion non-interference by the state on per-
sonal matters, as reflected in Isaiah Berlin’s discussion of negative liberty.140
Historically, Daoist communities have also promulgated and adhered to various
rules designed to facilitate physical, social, and spiritual development.141 Thus,
139. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
140. Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Isaiah Berlin
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 121–54.
141. Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture (see note 5 above); and Kohn, Cosmos and Conti-
nuity (see note 20 above).
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Daoism as a religion and comprehensive school of thought is by no means inher-
ently opposed to the presence of rules, legal rights, or institutionalized procedures
to facilitate human development, as is likewise evident in the practices of Daoist
communities, which at times have practiced strict taboos.142 Furthermore, the
DDJ andOn Liberty both seek to achieve a balance between following rules and giv-
ing way to spontaneity, with a justification of the former being to engender the lat-
ter. As Mill notes, “in the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is nec-
essary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people
may know what they have to expect; but in each person’s own concerns, his indi-
vidual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise.”143 For Mill, the law spells out each
individual’s rights and duties as each person living in society
should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This
conduct consists first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather
certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit under-
standing, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s
bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and
sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and
molestation.144
Thus, Mill, and liberals more generally, believe in the necessity of legal rights to
protect individuals from harm, but they also believe that only certain issues should
fall under the “legitimate sphere of legal control.”145 As Michael Freeden argues:
Consciously appending instrumental status to rights as servants of individ-
uality and development . . . Mill shifted rights to a relatively peripheral and
marginal position. Their inviolability was not central to a universal theory
of political society; rather, their broad utility was proportionate to their role
in fostering individuality.146
Thus, Mill perceived rights as only one of several possible means to achieve the
ultimate end of liberty; other means include better education, limited and respon-
sible government, competent and quality rulers, participation of the people in
142. John Blofeld, Taoism: The Road to Immortality (Boulder, Colo.: Shambala, 1978).
143. Mill, On Liberty, 77 (see note 86 above).
144. Ibid., 75.
145. Ibid., 12.
146. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 163 (see note 57 above).
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government, people behaving rationally, and each individual’s own self-development
and self-cultivation.147
By contrast, any discussion of a judicial or legal apparatus and rights is absent
from the DDJ. However, that does not automatically make it an anarchist or lib-
ertarian text; such an interpretation would miss other foundational elements of
Laozi’s thought. As Clarke points out, “the Taoist attitude was one which encour-
aged self-cultivation and self-fulfillment rather than a libertarian ideal of unfet-
tered rational agency.”148 Moreover, the DDJ emphasizes compassion (慈, ci), im-
plying empathy for other peoples and species.149 Thus, while libertarians might
embrace a state that promotes only negative liberty such that people are putatively
free to do as they please, Daoism’s emphasis on meeting basic needs, abstaining
from desires such as “eating rich and fancy foods” or “accumulating too many
things,”150 and having freedom from threats to one’s physical health implies a state
committed to ensuring (even if not directly providing) both positive freedoms (for
example, through public goods and services such as medicine and health care) as
well as negative freedoms. This view is admittedly much more consonant with
modern developmental liberalism—as espoused, for instance, by the capabilities ap-
proach151—than with neo-classical protective liberalism or a libertarian view, which
advocates a minimal state.152 As opposed to tolerating the economic inequality that
is inevitably engendered by libertarian (including neo-liberal) approaches to state-
hood, Daoism actually seeks the opposite—“the curtailment of desire, the promo-
tion of contentment and the notion that frugality generates riches all point in the
direction of an egalitarian rather than an unequal economy.”153
A second procedural issue on which Mill’s liberalism appears to diverge from
Laozi is the former’s insistence upon popular representation. Laozi, like all classical
Chinese political thinkers, assumes some form of elitist dictatorial or monarchical
147. Ibid., 141–68.
148. Clarke, “Taoist Politics,” 262 (see note 12 above).
149. Zhang, “Weapons,” 490 (see note 114 above).
150. Kohn, Daoism and Chinese Culture, 23 (see note 20 above).
151. On the capabilities approach, see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York:
Anchor Books, 1999); and Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Develop-
ment Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).
152. Devin Joshi, “The Protective and Developmental Varieties of Liberal Democracy: A
Difference in Kind or Degree?” Democratization 20 (2013): 187–214. It is important to note that
J. S. Mill is a complex thinker who does not easily fit into any one camp within Western liber-
alism and that his writings predate the emergence of the capabilities approach, but given his
later writings on socialism, he would likely lean more toward developmental liberalism than
protective liberalism.
153. Barbalet, “Market Relations,” 349 (see note 10 above).
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rule as an inevitable feature of government.154 Yet one should not forget that even
Mill overwhelmingly concurs with the DDJ in viewing only elites as worthy of tak-
ing on the job of political leadership. Mill called for a representative parliament
only as a means for the expression of public opinion to influence political leaders
and to check executive authority, and not as a means for advancing radical or pop-
ulist anti-elitism.155
Laozi’s emphasis on sage leadership alsomight seem incompatible with political
representation or institutions such as people’s assemblies.156 However, one should
not assume that popular representation is incompatible with rule by sages or with
skepticism toward social norms. First, at no point does the DDJ oppose electoral
processes for selecting political leaders, nor does it ever call for rulers to be chosen
on a hereditary basis or for future leaders to be hand-picked by current leaders. The
key criteria for being worthy of political leadership are morality and competence
(i.e., knowledge and practice of the dao), which suggests that anyone who tries
could become a sage. Laozi’s envisioned sage rulers are worthy of political leader-
ship because they set a positive example by living simply, meditating, communicat-
ing clearly, observing and following nature, and not interfering in people’s lives by
saddling them with excessive demands and propaganda. At the same time, the sage
is neither out of touch with nor above the people: “The sage often has no will. He
takes the people’s will as his own. What is good I treat with goodness. What is not
good I also treat with goodness. Thus I obtain goodness.”157 One way for a society to
possibly enjoy rule by such public-spirited sagely leaders might be through the pro-
cess of elections.
More concrete support for the idea that Laozi’s thought is compatible with elec-
toral processes and a representative assembly stems from the practices of con-
temporary Daoist organizations in the Republic of China (Taiwan), which granted
operational freedom to religious associations after it lifted martial law in 1987.
Studying governance practices among Taiwanese Daoists since this change, Cheng-
Tian Kuo observed elections to form a representative assembly and for selecting
leaders to be standard practices: “Most Daoist temples in Taiwan are not governed
by the clergy but by lay believers . . . . Lay believers are elected among themselves
154. Roger T. Ames, “Is Political Taoism Anarchism?” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10 (1983):
27–47; and Feldt, “Governing through the Dao” (see note 36 above).
155. Mill, Considerations (see note 110 above); Mill, On Liberty (see note 86 above).
156. For instance, Daoist hermetic practice as an intense expression of commitment to
Daoist ideology suggests embracing a life completely free from the bounds of social limitations
in favor of meditation and letting go of social indoctrination and desires.
157. DDJ, ch. 49 (see note 53 above).
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into an assembly of representatives. A governing committee is established by a vote
in the assembly . . . . A chairman is then elected by the committee members.”158
Likewise, the Daoist Association of the Republic of China follows “a democratic
election system to elect its representatives from the local level to the national level.”159
The presence of elections and representative assemblies within these contemporary
Daoist communities certainly suggests compatibility with political liberalism in terms
of incorporating popular representation.
Another observation of Daoist communities in Taiwan is their heavy emphasis
on practices and rituals designed to foster peace, health, longevity, and prosperity.
Daoists engage in the recitation of scriptures for the purpose of gaining immortality
(longevity) and to “guarantee the security and prosperity of the state.”160 Daoist
chiao (醮, jiao) rituals likewise aim to enhance the health and prosperity of the
community and its participants.161 Thus, while such practices do not aim to achieve
Mill’s goal of progress per se, they do champion prosperity, which indicates a mo-
tivation and incentive to be integrated into larger-scale trade and economic activity
(as opposed to pursing autarky), as well as an inclination toward governance ar-
rangements that can deliver shared prosperity.162
To sum up, if there are major differences between Laozi’s thought andMill’s lib-
eralism, they stem from procedural rather than substantive issues. While it is pos-
sible that detractors will feel that Laozi fails to sufficiently meet the procedural cri-
teria of Western liberalisms, it might also be the case that mostWestern variants of
liberalismmay be deficient on substantive grounds in meeting the standards of lib-
erty put forth by Laozi. For instance, liberty can be conceptualized narrowly, as
freedom from the state (negative freedom) for men with property or more broadly
as including autonomy enabled by the state (positive freedom) and freedom by or
from society for everyone, including women, people without property, people from
other countries, and non-human species. Finally, the dialectical history of liberal-
ism—the broadening of its scope and resistance against such broadening—has
been driven by critiques issued by feminists (over freedom for women and freedom
158. Kuo, Religion and Democracy, 62 (see note 7 above).
159. Ibid., 64.
160. Michel Strickmann, “The Longest Taoist Scripture,” History of Religions 17 (1978):
331–54, at 340.
161. Michael R. Saso, “The Taoist Tradition in Taiwan,” China Quarterly 41 (1970): 83–102;
and Kenneth Dean, “Field Notes on Two Taoist Jiao Observed in Zhangzhou in December
1985,” Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie 2 (1986): 191–209.
162. While some Daoists may choose to live on remote mountaintops, the fact that many
(in fact, most) Daoists live among the people also indicates an attitude of adaptability and being
pragmatic; see Saso, “The Taoist Tradition” (see previous note).
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from society), socialists and Marxists (over freedom for people without property),
cosmopolitans and anti-colonialists (over freedom for people from other coun-
tries), and environmentalists (over freedom for non-human species).163
The relevant question is where Laozi’s thought fits in. Unlike most Western lib-
eralisms, Laozi does not make a distinction between a liberal public sphere and a
private sphere, an anthrosphere and an ecosphere, or nationals/citizens and for-
eigners/aliens. Laozi is ostensibly concerned with freeing both humans and non-
human species, both men and women, whether or not they own property or what
country they live in. The liberty that Laozi espouses is not bound by nationalistic,
sexist, speciesist, or classist limitations. And in that sense, Laozi’s political thought
can be seen as an exceptionally broad form of liberalism representing a thicker
notion of freedom than that conceptualized by most conventional variants of West-
ern liberalism, feminism, or cosmopolitanism which focus almost exclusively on
humans.
A likely reason for Laozi’s broader orientation toward freedom is that his think-
ing takes tianxia (天下, all under heaven, i.e. the world), rather than the nation-
state, as its reference point and unit of analysis.164 As Tingyang Zhao points out,
the concept of tianxia establishes a “global perspective as opposed to local or na-
tional ones. Viewing the world as a whole is an epistemological principle first used
by Laozi.”165 This shift in unit of analysis also has broad implications for how we
think about liberty and the question of “whose liberty?”
The advantage of the all-under-heavenworldwide theory comes from the very
scope of its perspective, being above national interests, and inviting us to con-
sider a much wider context, in which the most complicated of problems
can be identified and solved . . . For instance, democracy, equality and liberty
have been developed in western democratic society, but never extended to
international society. This case of political inconsistency and intransitivity
could greatly damage the reputation of democracy, equality and liberty.166
163. See Fawcett, Liberalism, 3 (see note 1 above). Edmund Fawcett terms this “the struggle
between liberalism for some and liberalism for all.”
164. In recent years, Zhao Tingyang has revived and promoted the tianxia concept for mak-
ing sense of global politics in today’s world. For thinkers like Zhao, the tianxia utopia or ideal
contains physical (land), psychological (mindset), and institutional (a world institution) com-
ponents. See Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-Under-Heaven’
(Tian Xia 天下),” Social Identities 12 (2006): 2–41; Tingyang Zhao, “A Political World Philos-
ophy in Terms of All-under-Heaven (Tian-xia),” Diogenes 221 (2009): 5–18.
165. Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 9 (see previous note).
166. Ibid., 12; and Zhao, “Rethinking Empire,” 33 (see note 64 above).
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Compared to the nation-state, no person or lands on Earth can be excluded from
tianxia, where the goal is to achieve harmony amongst peoples who “have the free-
dom to migrate to, and work in, any state they like.”167 In other words, social har-
mony is to encompass everyone and not be limited to any single country.168
Conclusion
As this study has illustrated, there is more than one Chinese model of governance,
and if the underlying notion behind liberalism is “freeing people from unques-
tioned dogmas and oppressive political structures,”169 then both Laozi and Mill
proffer us bonafide models of liberalism. As discussed above, Laozi’s Dao De Jing,
the religion of Daoism’s most influential text, envisions a political system that
is non-authoritarian; nurtures the longevity of men, women, non-human species,
and the environment; is peaceful and nonviolent; embraces pluralism in discourse;
and encourages simplicity of lifestyle over indulgence in luxuries, extravagance, and
wastefulness. Similarly, John Stuart Mill’s treatise On Liberty embraces the goals of
non-authoritarianism and pluralism in discourse while critiquing patriarchy, con-
formity, and wastefulness. Simply stated, both traditions share an overlapping con-
sensus opposing social rigidity and brute imposition of one particular social stan-
dard over other ways of thinking and acting.
As Freeden observes, “liberalism’s self-critical spirit is morphologically corrob-
orated by the conscious readiness of liberals to entertain multiple rearrangements
of their conceptual furniture to a far greater extent than would non-liberal ideol-
ogists. Skepticism, non-dogmatism, and tolerance are thus translated into a dispo-
sition for conceptual reconfiguration.”170 A comparable level of pluralism and
openness is likewise observable in classical Daoist texts and contemporary Daoist
religious practices, whereby “most Daoist temples also include deities of Buddhism
and folk religions, while very few Buddhist temples worship Daoist deities.”171
Among traditional schools of Chinese thought, Daoism also proposes a more hor-
izontal view of relationships and offers a firm challenge to blindly submitting to
167. Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy,” 9 (see note 164 above).
168. Devin Joshi, “Does China’s Recent ‘Harmonious Society’ Discourse Reflect a Shift to-
wards Human Development?,” Journal of Political Ideologies 17 (2012): 169–87.
169. Fred Dallmayr, “Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” in Compar-
ative Political Theory, ed. Fred Dallmayr (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 7–20 at 16.
170. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, 177 (see note 57 above).
171. Kuo, Religion and Democracy, 58 (see note 7 above).
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authority. For this reason, the orientation of Daoism towards human liberty has
always traditionally been seen as a threat to authoritarian systems of rule.172
What is also evident here is that Laozi’s thought as an early Chinese version of
liberalism differs from what is sometimes labeled “democracy with Chinese char-
acteristics.”173 Chinese peoples in Taiwan have embraced a version of liberal de-
mocracy influenced by Chinese thinkers such as Sun Yat-Sen,174 and some Chinese
citizens in mainland China have expressed positive attitudes towards liberal de-
mocracy in forums such as the Internet.175 By contrast, deliberative democracy ex-
periments in mainland China as a component of “democracy with Chinese char-
acteristics”176 for the most part represent only an illiberal form of consultative
authoritarianism177 reminiscent of strategies employed by developmental states
elsewhere in Northeast and Southeast Asia.178 As Baogang He notes, in main-
land China longer-term trials of these experiments have thus far been confined
172. Li, Daozhi yu Ziyou (see note 19 above).
173. Young Nam Cho, “Democracy with Chinese Characteristics? A Critical Review from a
Developmental State Perspective,” Issues and Studies 45 (2009): 71–106, at 72; the Chinese
phrase is 中国特色民主.
174. David Lorenzo points out how contemporary Taiwanese democracy is largely per-
ceived as a liberal democracy, but also involves elements of competitive elitism and what he calls
a “Chinese unitary model of democracy,” which incorporates the ideas of a unified mass of “the
people” who are separate from the elites whereby some of the latter play a paternalistic caretaker
role for the population based on the ideas of minben (民本, government that aims to benefit the
people) and jiuwang (救亡, belief in the necessity of having a powerful centralized state to pro-
tect the country from potential crises). See David J. Lorenzo, Conceptions of Chinese Democracy:
Reading Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, and Chiang Ching-Kuo (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2013), 207.
175. Devin Joshi and Yizhe Xu, “What Do Chinese Really Think of Democracy and India?”
Journal of Contemporary China 26 (2017): 385–402.
176. “Democracy with Chinese characteristics” is sometimes used to describe the combina-
tion of village-level elections in mainland China, elements of intraparty democracy within the
Chinese Communist Party, consultative feedback mechanisms, and the state’s efforts to adopt
the rule of law. See Lorenzo, Conceptions, 197 (see note 174 above).
177. Baogang He, “Western Theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Chinese Practice of
Complex Deliberative Governance,” in The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China, ed. Ethan
J. Leib and Baogang He (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 133–48; Cho, “Democracy” (see
note 173 above); and Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation: The Delib-
erative Turn in Chinese Political Development,” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011): 269–89.
178. See Cho, “Democracy” (see note 173 above). As Garry Rodan argues, “state control
over who can participate-and on what issues and how—offers the possibility of expanding po-
litical space while narrowing the substantive issues open to contest. . .participants may influence
public policy and debate thereof, but not on terms set by the participants themselves.” See Garry
Rodan, Participation without Democracy: Containing Conflict in Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2018), 37.
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to only a few locations.179 Moreover, no power is delegated to the people when
invitation-only public hearings and nonbinding consultations take place within
the context of previously set agendas, censorship, and centralized control. Rather,
it appears such tactics aim to strengthen the ruling party’s authoritarian control
rather than to liberalize politics.180
In sum, the underlying intent, small scale, and limited impact of such reforms
appears to be largely out of step with Laozi’s vision of a society with few restrictions
on discourse and with an emphasis on peace, living in harmony with nature, and
minimizing desires. Governance in mainland China thus far in the twenty-first
century has featured a degree of openness in the economic domain and even some
forms of consultation and deliberation in public policy making, but this has been
accompanied by many non-pluralist practices in other domains, including govern-
ment censorship over media,181 restrictions on civil society,182 promotion of mass
consumption,183 repression of dissidents,184 and environmental destruction that
has harmed the health of humans and other species.185
To conclude, Daoist thought and the DDJ have been subject to selective appro-
priation throughout history. For example, Liu Junning argues:
Indeed, what we now call Western-style liberalism has featured in China’s
own culture for millennia. We first see it with philosopher Laozi, the founder
of Taoism. In the sixth century B.C. Laozi articulated a political philosophy
that has come to be known as wu wei, or inaction. “Rule a big country as
179. He, “Western Theories,” 135 (see note 177 above).
180. Baogang He and Mark Warren describe it as “a regime strategy of channeling political
conflict away from regime-level participation, such as multi-party competition, and into
‘governance-level’ participation, segmented into policy-focused, often administratively- or
juridically-organized venues”; see He and Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation,” 270 (see
note 177 above). Young Nam Cho has labeled it mere “window dressing for Chinese authori-
tarianism”; see Cho, “Democracy,” 88 (see note 173 above).
181. Qiuqing Tai, “China’s Media Censorship: A Dynamic and Diversified Regime,” Journal
of East Asian Studies 14 (2014): 185–210; and Jason Q. Ng, Blocked on Weibo: What Gets Sup-
pressed on China’s Version of Twitter (and Why) (New York: New Press, 2013).
182. Berthold Kuhn, “Changing Spaces for Civil Society Organizations in China,” Open
Journal of Political Science 8 (2018): 467–94; and Frank N. Pieke, “The Communist Party
and Social Management in China,” China Information 26 (2012): 149–65.
183. Nicholas R. Lardy, “China: Toward a Consumption-Driven Growth Path,” in Seeking
Changes: The Economic Development in Contemporary China, ed. Yanhui Zhou (Singapore:
World Scientific, 2016), 85–111.
184. Lynette H. Ong, “Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China,” China Journal
80 (2018): 94–110.
185. Judith Shapiro, China’s Environmental Challenges, 2nd Edition (Cambridge, U.K.: Pol-
ity Press, 2016).
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you would fry a small fish,” he said. That is, don’t stir too much. “The more
prohibitions there are, the poorer the people become,” he wrote in his mag-
num opus, the Daodejing.186
Systematically testing this claim of liberalism’s early emergence in China through
a comparative reading of Laozi’s Dao De Jing and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,
I found sufficient equivalences such that one could classify Laozi’s thought as an
early Chinese variant of liberalism. While such a view may be deemed unconven-
tional or even heretical by dominant Western, Eurocentric, or Confucian lenses,
such naming would certainly accord well with the spirit of Daoist thought, which
is to encourage multiple interpretations of texts as opposed to rigidly insisting on
only one correct reading.187 Finally, what deserves emphasis here is that in the legacy
of Laozi, China already has a highly developed indigenous tradition of liberal
thought illustrating that at least certain elements of Chinese culture are compatible
with pluralism and political liberalism.
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